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From the Open Skies Proposal of 1955 to the
Norstad Plan of 1960: A Plan Too Far
✣ David Tal
On 16 May 1960 the West German newspaper Die Welt re-
ported that General Lauris Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander in Eu-
rope (SACEUR) for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), had
sent a draft plan to the government of the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) for its consideration. Norstad was proposing the establishment of a
military inspection zone in Central Europe. The disclosure of this plan in Die
Welt killed any prospects for its adoption, and Norstad’s proposal soon sank
into oblivion. Recent studies of U.S. and Western security and foreign poli-
cies in the 1950s and 1960s make no mention of the Norstad Plan.1 This
omission from the historical record is both unfortunate and unwarranted.
Careful study of the relevant documents deposited at the U.S. National Ar-
chives and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library—some of them
declassiªed only in the late 1990s—reveals that what came to be known as the
Norstad Plan originated in President Eisenhower’s Open Skies proposal of
July 1955. Walt Rostow, who took part in the discussions leading up to Open
Skies, summarized this episode as follows: “For our limited purpose, the sim-
ple fact is that Open Skies was rejected by [the Soviet Union].”2
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Random House, 1988); Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent
and America 1957–1962 (Oxford, UK: The Clarendon Press, 1994); Murray Donnette, Kennedy,
Macmillan and Nuclear Weapons (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press, 2000); Matthew Evangelista,
Unarmed Forces (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 119–120; John L. Gaddis et al. eds., Cold
War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999); Oliver Kendrick, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Nuclear Test-Ban Debate, 1961–1963 (New York:
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Even as students of U.S. arms control policy continue to debate whether
Eisenhower really intended Open Skies to be a serious disarmament plan or
simply a propaganda measure, less known is the fact that the Soviet Union’s
rejection of the proposal was not the end of it.3 In Washington, DC, ofªcials
disagreed about a proper follow-up strategy. Because the Open Skies proposal
had evoked a generally favorable response in the world, some ofªcials believed
that the United States should build on this apparent propaganda victory over
the Soviet Union and proceed further with it, regardless of the chances of im-
plementation. Others favored holding negotiations that would allow the
proposal to be modiªed in a way acceptable to Moscow. At the heart of the
debate lay the question of what exactly U.S. goals were in disarmament nego-
tiations. On this issue, historians remain divided. Some scholars assume that
the United States under Eisenhower was sincere in its pursuit of disarmament,
whereas others claim that Eisenhower either had no intention of reaching a
disarmament agreement or, if he had such an intention, was unable to over-
come the objections of those within his administration who opposed it.4
An examination of the untold story of the process that led from Open
Skies to the Norstad Plan sheds new light on the signiªcance of the Open
Skies proposal and its impact on the Eisenhower administration’s approach to
nuclear disarmament. The years 1955–1960 were a period of change, during
which, in response to both external and internal factors, U.S. disarmament
policy lost some of the rigid features that had hitherto impeded progress, al-
lowing a more moderate and ºexible stance to be adopted. Historians are
aware of this process of change, but it still needs to be elucidated because of
the customary division of the Eisenhower administration’s disarmament poli-
cy into two unrelated periods: the ªrst lasting from January 1953 to July 1955
and the second from July 1955 to the end of Eisenhower’s presidency. The
ªrst period is portrayed as a preliminary stage leading up to the Open Skies
proposal, and the years after July 1955 are seen as a time when the administra-
tion was preoccupied with the nuclear test ban negotiations.5
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In reality, U.S. disarmament policy during the second half of the 1950s
did not consist only of the test ban talks. The administration was also work-
ing intensively to move from the Open Skies proposal to the Norstad Plan.
Scrutiny of that process shows that Eisenhower was more inclined to consider
new approaches than has previously been assumed. Furthermore, the process
involved little-known intra-administration struggles as well as later conºicts
within NATO over the initiative to establish limited inspection zones in Cen-
tral Europe and the Arctic Circle, an initiative that had signiªcant inºuence
on the changes in U.S. disarmament policy. This article is intended to cast
some light on these relatively obscure developments and thus to extend our
knowledge of the complexities of managing the Cold War.
Open Skies as a Starting Point
On 21 July 1955 President Eisenhower met with three other leaders—British
Prime Minister Anthony Eden, French Prime Minister Edgar Faure, and So-
viet Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin—at the Palais des Nations in Geneva
and presented a plan that would soon exercise a profound effect on U.S. disar-
mament policy. Known as the Open Skies proposal, the plan called on the
United States and the Soviet Union “to give to each other a complete blue-
print of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of
our countries to the other; lay out the establishments and provide the blue-
prints to each other.” The next proposed stage would allow reconnaissance
ºights to photograph each other’s territory in order “to end the possibility of
massive surprise attack,” thus easing international tensions and improving the
political climate enough to make progress on arms reduction.6 Soviet leaders,
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however, declined Eisenhower’s plan. Two months earlier, on 10 May 1955,
they had presented their most far-reaching proposal for reducing armaments
and prohibiting nuclear weapons, with the key requirement that enforcement
procedures be based on inspections at ªxed points such as ports, railway junc-
tions, major road arteries, and airports.7 The Soviet leaders would not go be-
yond that, and their reaction to Eisenhower’s Open Skies proposal was un-
equivocal and “100 percent negative” inasmuch as they perceived it as a
“means of acquiring intelligence information on both sides.”8
To some extent, this allegation was right. Open Skies was not a response
to some urgent new need. Nothing had changed since the previous U.S. intel-
ligence estimate in 1953 about the prospects of a surprise attack. Nor was the
proposal meant to be a means of managing the Cold War. It was intended,
rather, as both a strategic-military tool and a propaganda instrument. On the
strategic-military side, Open Skies was an expression of Eisenhower’s belief
that technological changes in modern warfare had rendered inadequate the
inspection apparatus ªrst introduced in 1946. U.S. disarmament policy since
1946 had been based on the notion that an effective inspection system was es-
sential to any disarmament agreement. The United States had ofªcially pre-
sented this idea in June 1946 in its Baruch Plan for the control of nuclear en-
ergy and had continued to give primacy to inspections ever since. By 1955,
however, Eisenhower assumed that advances in modern warfare had outpaced
the inspection devices of the immediate postwar period. In the mid-1950s,
tracking down nuclear bomb–making plants was no longer sufªcient. With
the development of modern delivery systems such as planes, submarines, and
intercontinental ballistic missiles, the two sides would have to devise more so-
phisticated means of inspection.9
In addition, the Eisenhower administration was hoping to compel the
Soviet Union to relax its domestic controls, with the aim of eroding and per-
haps eventually tearing open the Iron Curtain and undermining the existing
Soviet political order.10 In that sense, the plan aimed to bring an end to the
Cold War, not to manage it. At a minimum, Eisenhower was hoping to gain
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an edge in the propaganda war with the USSR.11 Some historians assume that
Open Skies was aimed at legalizing what would otherwise be illegal intelli-
gence operations and that the project spurred the development of U-2 recon-
naissance plane.12 But in fact the linkage between U-2 ºights and the Open
Skies proposal is not at all obvious. One important purpose of Open Skies re-
connaissance ºights was to provide warning of surprise nuclear attack, a task
that necessitated frequent and safe overºights. However, the historians of the
U-2 operation contend that “the years 1956–1960 were marked by long peri-
ods during which no overºights occurred, followed by brief bursts of activ-
ity.”13 Although Open Skies–related ºights could have supplanted U-2 recon-
naissance, the ºights were simply not frequent enough to provide warning of
nuclear surprise attacks.
In earlier years, the Soviet Union’s unequivocal rejection of Eisenhower’s
proposal would have led to a stalemate. The prevailing approach to disarma-
ment under both Harry Truman and Eisenhower during his ªrst two years
was one of take-it-or-leave-it. U.S. ofªcials would propose a “package deal”
without searching for a compromise formula designed to meet the Soviet
Union at least halfway. This approach stalled the discussions on the Baruch
Plan in 1946 and shaped the ideas laid out by Eisenhower in his Chance for
Peace address in April 1953. But by mid-1955, things were different for two
main reasons. The ªrst was the Soviet “Peace Offensive” launched after Josif
Stalin’s death in March 1953 and culminating in the Soviet proposal of 10
May 1955. The scope of inspections in the latest Soviet plan was less than that
sought by the Americans, but it nevertheless signaled a departure from pre-
vious Soviet positions on disarmament. U.S. ofªcials were unsure whether the
proposal marked a real change in Soviet thinking, but Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles believed, almost against his own convictions, that regardless of
what lay behind this apparent new direction in Soviet foreign policy, the
United States must explore it and respond in a positive manner in order to
avoid being portrayed as the party rejecting any peaceful overtures.14
The second reason for the change in the traditional U.S. take-it-or-leave-
it approach was organizational. In March 1955 Eisenhower had appointed
the former governor of Minnesota, Harold Stassen, as his special assistant on
disarmament. Stassen was given cabinet ranking, and after August 1955 he
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also became deputy representative to the United Nations (UN) Disarmament
Commission.15 Having been appointed to the job, Stassen performed it in the
way he believed would both advance the cause of disarmament and promote
U.S. interests. The Open Skies proposal gave him an opportunity to make a
change in U.S. disarmament policy. In light of the Soviet Union’s reaction,
Open Skies seemed as infeasible as previous plans, and Stassen tried to ªgure
out how to move forward. The issue became a source of contention between
Dulles and Stassen, with Eisenhower vacillating between them. Stassen
wanted to try to make the plan acceptable to Moscow, even if the requisite
modiªcations weakened the proposal. He proposed that they ªrst test the
whole system of inspection by establishing a Technical Exchange Panel con-
sisting of inspectors from countries that were represented on the UN Disar-
mament Subcommittee: the United States, Canada, France, the United King-
dom, and the Soviet Union. These inspectors would visit selected military
installations in the United States and the USSR to learn how the inspection
mechanism could be put into operation, and they would then make technical
recommendations concerning future inspection procedures. Stassen assumed
that if Soviet leaders agreed to experiment with arms inspections in a limited
context, they would not be able to stop there and would eventually be forced
to agree to the next stage; namely, an expanded inspection regime.16 This
thinking marked a signiªcant departure from U.S. policymakers’ customary
insistence on take-it-or-leave-it. Stassen wanted to engage the Soviet Union in
negotiations over modiªcation of the original plan.
Dulles opposed Stassen’s suggested change of course. In the days leading
up to the July 1955 Geneva conference, Dulles had expressed his opposition
to Open Skies, but after the conference he was impressed by the warm re-
sponse given to the initiative. Headlines in The New York Times declared “Ja-
pan Hailed U.S. Bid” and “French papers impressed.”17 This favorable reac-
tion encouraged Dulles to take full advantage of the plan’s popularity by
basing U.S. disarmament policy on Open Skies. That is, his main interest was
in the propaganda value of the plan, not its viability, and he believed that the
United States should adhere to the plan in its existing form regardless of the
Soviet response. He argued that Stassen’s approach weakened Eisenhower’s
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Open Skies proposal and that the positive world reaction to the proposal was
useful for keeping the Soviet Union in an uncomfortable position. Dulles ar-
gued that if the United States were suddenly to offer a limited inspection
zone, it would let Soviet leaders off the hook, allowing them to claim that by
agreeing to limited inspections they were doing their share.18
The difference between Dulles and Stassen was important. Whereas
Dulles and some other ofªcials saw the primary importance of Open Skies as
its dual propaganda and military value and believed that no change was neces-
sary, Stassen regarded the plan as only the beginning. In Stassen’s view, Open
Skies was valuable as a tool that, if properly adjusted, would lead to a shift in
the U.S. approach to disarmament. Dulles, by contrast, was little concerned
about the plan’s impact on U.S. disarmament policy. Was Stassen so persua-
sive and adept at bureaucratic maneuvering that, single-handedly, he could
bring about a change in U.S. disarmament policy, overcoming the resistance
of powerful ªgures at the State Department, the Defense Department, and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)? Historians’ answer to that question has gener-
ally been negative. Accordingly, they have downplayed Stassen’s impact on
U.S. disarmament policy and have argued that his eventual resignation be-
cause of the way he acted during the disarmament negotiations attests to his
weakness.19 The evidence, however, shows that Stassen, through his tactics
and negotiating techniques, managed to initiate a change that would be im-
plemented not by him but by the man who helped to engineer his downfall—
John Foster Dulles.
Stassen accomplished this feat in part because he had Eisenhower’s sup-
port. Although historians remain divided over Eisenhower’s disarmament pol-
icy, the evidence shows that the president wanted to achieve a nuclear disar-
mament agreement. He believed that the nuclear arms race was expensive,
dangerous, and destructive and that disarmament was desirable if questions of
trust and inspection could be resolved: “The inherent problem was that of
people who are characterized by honesty and good intentions combating peo-
ple who are dishonest and whose intentions are not good. Thus we will take
and agree only to those things that we can prove.”20 Under these circum-
stances, an effective nuclear disarmament agreement would be nearly impossi-
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ble to achieve, leaving the United States vulnerable to a surprise nuclear at-
tack. The Open Skies proposal was intended to defuse this threat, and Stassen
seemed to offer a path that could lead to a breakthrough.21
Hence, Dulles, despite his objections, did not reject Stassen’s plan out of
hand. Instead, he tried to ensure that the limited inspection zone proposal
would ªt into U.S. disarmament policy, arguing that it should be pursued si-
multaneously with Open Skies. Dulles thus helped Stassen to make the in-
spection zone an integral part of the disarmament negotiations, where it be-
came a ªxture for the other participants and a proposal that Stassen gradually
maneuvered to his own advantage. Dulles spoke of the limited zone concept
in preparatory talks before the meeting of foreign ministers in October 1955.
He offered to create a limited inspection zone that would include Belgium,
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, a uniªed Ger-
many, and an area of equal size in the Eastern bloc. The two sides would agree
to limits on the scope of armed forces stationed in this area, and the limits
would be veriªed through aerial reconnaissance and ground inspections.
Dulles insisted that unless Germany was uniªed the plan would be unviable
because the Germans would be given to understand that the West accepted
the division of their country as a permanent fact. For Dulles, the most impor-
tant aspect of this proposal was German uniªcation, and he indicated that the
United States would not support the limited inspection zone unless it was ac-
companied by German uniªcation.22 Dulles did not have to wait long to win
support in West Germany for his position. No sooner had the idea been
broached than Heinrich von Brentano, the FRG foreign minister, expressed
his objection to the establishment of an inspection zone that would encom-
pass a divided Germany.23
In setting these conditions for the inspection zone plan, Dulles allowed
Stassen to move ahead, but with formidable strings attached. Eisenhower did
likewise, stipulating that Stassen’s inspection plan must be based on the Open
Skies proposal and on the Soviet plan of 10 May, though he agreed that
Stassen could begin the process by concluding an agreement to designate
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small strips of territory in the United States and the USSR as a test of the fea-
sibility of an inspection system.24 Stassen ªrst presented his plan to the UN
Disarmament Subcommittee when it met in London in March–April 1956.
The three Western representatives endorsed the plan, but the Soviet delega-
tion rejected it, arguing that the United States was more interested in inspec-
tion than in disarmament.25 One member of the Soviet delegation claimed
that aerial inspection would not prevent surprise attack and that only the
ground control posts included in the Soviet proposal of 10 May were ade-
quate for this purpose.26 Indeed, this aspect of the Soviet plan was integrated
into a larger proposal that the Soviet delegation presented to the subcommit-
tee on 27 March 1956 calling for the reduction of conventional armaments
and armed forces. The Soviet proposal also included Eden’s suggestion in July
1955 that they create a limited zone of inspection of armaments in Europe
that would include both halves of Germany as well as adjacent states.27 The
UN Disarmament Subcommittee adjourned on 7 May 1956 without agree-
ment, but both Stassen and the Soviet delegation hoped to resume the talks
soon.28
To try to make the Western proposal more acceptable to the Soviet del-
egation, Stassen included a provision distinguishing between inspections
for disarmament and inspections intended to forestall surprise attack. He
claimed that any disarmament plan must be guaranteed by an inspection pro-
gram based on Eisenhower’s Open Skies proposal, combined with the Soviet
ground inspection plan of 10 May. With regard to surprise attack, Stassen rec-
ommended development of an inspection and control system on a smaller
scale, even if this would be inadequate to serve as a permanent arms control
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system. The system would consist of partial aerial surveillance, coupled with
ground posts and radar installations.29
The Soviet government announced its acceptance of the test inspection
zone while deferring action on Eisenhower’s aerial surveillance plan. Soviet
ofªcials continued to insist that the test inspection zone did not preclude the
need to control disarmament or prevent aggression, but if the idea was so im-
portant to the United States and was a precondition for a disarmament agree-
ment, then the Soviet government was ready to establish a zone that would
stretch 800 kilometers from east to west, starting from a demarcation line di-
viding the military forces of the two sides.30
State Department ofªcials opposed Stassen’s distinction between inspec-
tion to prevent surprise attack and inspection to verify arms reductions, and
they called for a single inspection system based on Eisenhower’s plan.31
Dulles, however, was ready to go along with a limited inspection zone, but
only on condition that the division line set by the Soviet Union would not be
the border between West Germany and East Germany. Instead, he wanted to
use the less politically sensitive boundary along the Oder and Neisse rivers
that divided Germany from Poland.32 Dulles’s position constituted a change
in U.S. policy on inspection. Up to this point, neither the Truman adminis-
tration nor the Eisenhower administration had been willing to entertain any-
thing less than a comprehensive inspection program. Dulles in effect was say-
ing that an inspection system could be implemented gradually, an approach
he offered to apply to arms reduction as well.33
The limited inspection zone was on the agenda of the UN Disarmament
Subcommittee when it next met in London in March 1957. The Soviet
Union and the United States each tabled a disarmament proposal, and Britain
and France jointly submitted a third proposal. All the proposals were thor-
oughly discussed, and the ªve members of the subcommittee agreed that the
limited inspection zone proposal was worthy of deliberation.34 The way was
open for Stassen to advance, and he proposed to create a limited aerial inspec-
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tion zone that would include parts of Canada and a small segment of the
northwestern United States and extend across the Danube to the west of Le-
ningrad. The zone would exclude most of the United States and Western Eu-
rope, but would cover sites of major troop concentration that were potential
staging posts for surprise attack. Anxious to avoid opposition from Dulles and
the West Germans, Stassen was careful not to make the division line the West
German–East German border; he instead designated it from Vienna to Stock-
holm. The reaction of other Western representatives was positive, as was the
response from Washington.35 The North Atlantic Council (NAC) discussed
the European zone proposal at the end of May 1957 and gave a generally posi-
tive response. The European members of the NAC expressed their desire to be
included in negotiations over the European zone and called for the military
command of NATO—mainly General Norstad—to consider the military
signiªcance and implications of the inspection zone concept.36
The Soviet response to Stassen’s proposal was also positive. Soviet Deputy
Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin, who headed the Soviet delegation, reintro-
duced a Soviet plan that had earlier been rejected by the West. However, this
time the proposal included an implied willingness to discuss a partial disarma-
ment plan, a change that led Stassen to conclude that Moscow was genuinely
ready to move ahead.37
The U.S. government’s reaction was also generally positive, apart from
the JCS. Admiral Arthur Radford, the JCS chairman, argued that the Soviet
Union could not be trusted and that Soviet leaders had reneged on earlier
commitments. The USSR, he said, was participating in disarmament negotia-
tions only because of the steady relative increase of American strength over the
past few years. Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson shared Radford’s view of
Soviet untrustworthiness and called for slow, careful movement in the disar-
mament negotiations. But he was inclined to accept the idea of a European
inspection zone, though without any preconditions. As he saw it, the Euro-
pean members of NATO should be the ones to decide whether to accept the
concept of an inspection zone, which would lead to a reduction of forces and
a prohibition on the stationing of American nuclear weapons, thus impairing
NATO’s defense capabilities. The inspection zone was also connected to the
broader issue of a European security system, one that would be part of Ger-
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man reuniªcation. If the NAC were to endorse the idea of an inspection zone,
Wilson recommended that it be pursued only with the simultaneous imple-
mentation of the Eisenhower plan in Europe.38
The trend within the U.S. administration was generally supportive of a
limited inspection zone, and consequently the State Department proposed
that two zones be discussed. One would be a U.S.-Soviet zone stretching
along Siberia, the Arctic Circle, Alaska, a section of western Canada and part
of the western United States. This zone would secure the U.S. homeland from
surprise attack. The second zone would be European and was the one of
greater interest to the Soviet Union. Echoing Wilson, Dulles contended that
the Europeans should have primary say on the latter zone and that any pro-
posals regarding it should ªrst be discussed by NATO and then, only after ap-
proval, be debated at the Disarmament Conference.39
This distinction between the U.S.-Soviet zone and the European-Soviet
zone seemed logical and even unavoidable, and the notion that a European
inspection zone would require the consent of the European members of the
North Atlantic alliance seemed equally logical. But these positions were also
bound to cause problems. One question that preoccupied European NATO
members was whether a Soviet-European inspection zone should be estab-
lished as part of a wider disarmament agreement or as a separate measure.
Those in favor of linking the two zones included Greece, Belgium, Denmark,
Norway, Luxembourg, and Canada. The Netherlands was against it. The
French representative to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, Jules Moch,
called for a European zone that would stretch from the Urals to the Atlantic,
and this proposal was endorsed by Turkey and Italy.40 West German Chancel-
lor Konrad Adenauer agreed that the ªrst limited steps toward disarmament
could be taken prior to German reuniªcation but that they should be re-
stricted to the U.S.-Soviet inspection zone. If the ªrst stage included a Euro-
pean zone together with other disarmament measures such as a limit on nu-
clear testing, a cessation of nuclear weapons production, and a limit on
conventional forces, the Soviet Union would lose any interest in moving to-
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ward a comprehensive disarmament agreement, and the question of German
reuniªcation would remain unresolved.41
Stassen was unhappy about these splits. He told West German ofªcials
that he was loath to see the talks break down because of Bonn’s objections.
Similar misgivings were expressed in the FRG as well. This pressure ultimately
bore fruit, as West German Foreign Minister von Brentano and the FRG am-
bassador to the United States, Heinz Krekeler, told Dulles and the U.S. am-
bassador in separate conversations that West Germany was ready to consider
the creation of an inspection zone, although not unconditionally. For in-
stance, if the Soviet Union raised the inspection issue, the United States
should discuss the Arctic zone option ªrst. But if Soviet ofªcials wanted to
discuss the European zone, this would necessitate several conditions: the other
NATO countries had to agree; it would not lead to formal recognition of East
Germany; the zone’s border could not correspond to the inner-German bor-
der; and the ªnal stage of disarmament was to be achieved only after resolu-
tion of the German problem.42
The NAC concluded by authorizing the Western representatives on the
UN Disarmament Subcommittee to continue negotiations over the proposed
inspection zone. The NAC also asked Norstad for his opinion.43 At a NAC
meeting in June 1957, he said that from a strictly military point of view he
supported the proposal to establish a European inspection zone because the
greatest danger to Western Europe was a ground or aerial surprise attack. He
therefore believed that a uniªed system of control and inspection based on
ground, air, and radar components would reduce this danger. Norstad added
that the region covered by ground inspections should include the two Ger-
manys, Poland, and Czechoslovakia and that aerial inspections should encom-
pass a larger area stretching from the French Atlantic to the Urals.44 He fo-
cused on the military aspects of the plan, but he was well aware of the political
implications, especially the concern that a division line running along the
boundary separating the two Germanys would perpetuate that country’s par-
tition.45
On 29 August 1957 U.S. diplomats presented a working paper on partial
measures of disarmament to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee laying out
the U.S. position on inspection zones. The paper listed ten disarmament mea-
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sures that should be undertaken during the ªrst stage of an agreement and de-
lineated three inspection zones: a larger zone comprising all the territory of
the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union; a limited zone running
along the Arctic line and including sections of the United States and the So-
viet Union, Canada, and other countries; and a third zone in Europe, ideally
from the Urals to the Atlantic, though a smaller area would be acceptable if it
included signiªcant sections of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.46 The
Soviet response to the working paper, including the inspection zone propos-
als, was negative, and the UN Disarmament Subcommittee session in Lon-
don adjourned.47
Eisenhower, Dulles, and Stassen met to try to ªgure out how to move for-
ward. Stassen proposed a direct approach that would offer the Soviet Union a
European inspection zone more to its liking. He introduced a revised proposal
calling on the United States to pursue a 24-month nuclear test suspension and
to establish a European inspection zone covering the same NATO territory as
in the previous plan, along with regions of Eastern Europe and a small por-
tion of the western USSR. This zone was smaller than in the August 1957
working paper, but Stassen insisted that it covered more territory than had
been stipulated by General Norstad as the essential minimum—a claim
Norstad later denied. Relying also on a statement made by Chancellor
Adenauer in Hamburg in reference to the inspection zone, Stassen argued that
the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Party’s victory in the West German
elections would make it easier for Adenauer to accept a European inspection
zone, and it would then be possible to address Soviet objections. If Moscow
accepted the inspection zone plan, Stassen said, the zone would constitute a
wedge between the Soviet Union and its East European satellites and would
thus help to erode the Soviet grip on these countries. The zone would also
help to open up the Soviet Union itself, a long-standing U.S. objective.48
Dulles and the JCS opposed Stassen’s new proposal, but Eisenhower
“found himself ” in agreement with Stassen.49 The president decided that
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Stassen’s inspection zones plan should be pursued with one alteration: whereas
Stassen was taking account of the Soviet Union’s reaction to each proposed
zone, Eisenhower wanted the American plan to be discussed ªrst with the
NATO allies. Only after securing their agreement could the plan be presented
to Moscow.50 Among Eisenhower’s reasons for this approach was the intro-
duction of a proposal by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki to the UN
General Assembly on 2 October 1957 for the denuclearization of Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and the two Germanys. The proposal included an implemen-
tation clause that envisaged “a system of broad and effective monitoring in the
area of the proposed zone.” The inspections were to be both on the ground
and from the air, and the experience gained in the process “could provide use-
ful experience for the realization of broader disarmament measures.”51 The
Soviet government embraced the Rapacki Plan, but NATO rejected it on the
grounds that it meant depriving member-states of their nuclear shield while
leaving the Soviet Union’s massive ground forces intact within striking dis-
tance of Western Europe.52 The British government, however, suggested that
the plan might be useful “as a basis for counter-proposals.” On separate occa-
sions, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and French envoy Jules
Moch introduced their own versions of what could be described as a hybrid of
the European inspection zone and the Rapacki Plan. The British called it the
“Disengagement Plan.”53 Although nothing came of either proposal, the Ei-
senhower administration felt obliged to respond to the European allies’ views.
Another incentive for supporting Stassen’s proposal was Norstad’s deci-
sion in early March 1958 to offer his own European inspection plan, based on
Stassen’s. With the disarmament talks stalemated, the general believed that
the United States and NATO should return to the European inspection zone
to try to regain the initiative that had seemingly been lost to the Soviet Union.
The European inspection zone, in Norstad’s view, had several advantages: it
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would impress public opinion in Western and other countries as a “forward-
looking easily understandable ªrst step toward the easing of cold war ten-
sions”; it would not prejudice the Western position on German reuniªcation
and would not imply de facto recognition of the East German regime; it
would not compromise the Western demand that the Soviet Union accept the
other proposals in the working paper submitted in August 1957; it would not
cause either side to fear unilateral capitulation on any essential elements of its
security; and it could be gradually implemented and thereby facilitate “both
practically and psychologically a wider détente in the future.”
Norstad proposed that the European inspection zone include East and
West Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. To allay the FRG’s concerns, he
agreed to consider bringing other NATO countries into the zone, possibly the
Netherlands and Belgium. He also proposed that the aerial inspection should
cover at least the same area as the ground inspection and that overlapping ra-
dar arrangements be included in the plan. In addition, Norstad argued that
the inspection and control of nuclear weapons should focus on means of de-
livery and on vehicles. Both sides, he said, would exchange blueprints of their
military installations and deployment of forces within the inspected area, and
the ªrst task of the inspection teams would be to verify the blueprints. The
teams should have their own lines of communication and their own commu-
nication systems and should be allowed complete mobility within the zone,
without needing to seek permission. In Norstad’s view, the inspection force
should consist of approximately 3,000 people—1,500 from each side—and
should comprise mixed American and Soviet teams. Although a force of this
size would not be able to track every military installation or object within the
inspection zone, it would be capable of tracking signiªcant troop movements
that might signal preparations for a surprise attack.
Norstad averred that such a zone would signiªcantly reduce the danger of
surprise attack and would be a more desirable alternative to both the Rapacki
Plan and the Disengagement Plan. The European inspection zone would not
compel NATO to surrender its best deterrence assets or compromise its ability
to defend Western Europe, and success with the zone would increase mutual
trust and help to ease international tensions, making it easier to move ahead
toward a comprehensive and effective control of armaments.54
With the introduction of the Norstad Plan, Stassen could claim that he
had accomplished the goals he set for himself after the Soviet Union rejected
the U.S. proposal of August 1957. Stassen had proposed that a smaller area be
put on the table, and Dulles had objected, but Norstad was now calling for a
European inspection zone that would be smaller than the one ªrst proposed.
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Dulles also had objected to Stassen’s attempts to separate the inspection zone
from the U.S. disarmament plan, but Norstad had now conferred his impri-
matur on the separation. But Stassen was not around to celebrate his victory,
having resigned as the president’s special assistant for disarmament on 14 Feb-
ruary 1958 after repeated clashes with Dulles.55
One might have expected that U.S. disarmament policy would revert to
the Open Skies proposal after Stassen’s forced resignation and that his notion
of incremental progress by means of partial agreements such as limited inspec-
tion zones would be abandoned. But as things turned out, partial agreements
remained a U.S. goal. With Stassen gone, Dulles endorsed a revised U.S. dis-
armament plan that was introduced in March 1958 and based to a great ex-
tent on Stassen’s plan.56 Dulles by this point had changed his views, having
sensed that a general and comprehensive disarmament agreement was unach-
ievable. He had come to realize that “there is no way of turning back history”
to a time when no nuclear bombs existed. He was ready to consider a more
limited formula that might be acceptable to the Soviet Union, and, even if the
Soviet Union did not accept it, the effort would at least make a good impres-
sion on world opinion—a point on which Eisenhower agreed.57 The president
told Dulles that a new approach to disarmament was necessary because world
opinion might put the blame for the stalemate in the disarmament negotia-
tions on the United States. New ideas that would prove to the international
community that Washington was sincere in its pursuit of an agreement were
therefore essential.58
But Eisenhower’s endorsement of the limited inspection zone idea was
more than just a tactical step to improve the U.S. image in the world. The
limited inspection zone offered U.S. disarmament policy a new direction,
which Eisenhower was anxious to see. The plan itself was not what mattered;
the important thing was that the United States would no longer adhere to an
all-or-nothing approach and would be ready to discuss partial measures. Ei-
senhower and Dulles saw the limited inspection zone idea as a way of break-
ing the stalemate in disarmament talks.59
A letter to Eisenhower from the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in April
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1958 provided the opportunity to move ahead with the inspection zone plan.
Khrushchev alleged that U.S. bombers armed with nuclear weapons had
ºown above the Arctic in the direction of the USSR. The Eisenhower admin-
istration responded by resubmitting to the UN Security Council a plan that
was also conveyed by Eisenhower to Khrushchev. The proposal, introduced
by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, called for the creation of an interna-
tional inspection system for the Arctic zone and for the establishment of
groups of technical experts from both sides who would jointly study the prob-
lems and feasibility of inspections to warn of surprise attack.60 Although the
immediate Soviet reaction was to vote against the proposal on the ground that
the proposed inspection zone was no more than an intelligence-gathering op-
eration, Khrushchev agreed to the meeting of the experts.61 In response,
Dulles asked James Killian, the special assistant to the president for science
and technology, to study the practical aspects of an inspection system to warn
of surprise attacks in designated zones.62 Dulles also encouraged the European
NATO allies to take part in the conference.63 The French, who objected to the
size of the zone proposed by Khrushchev, were afraid that the conference of
experts might become a ªrst step toward the establishment of such a zone.
They proposed instead that the experts should discuss the subject in abstracto,
without relation to any speciªc zones.64 The U.S. administration concurred
and revised its proposal to meet the French demands. The objectives of the
conference would be to provide a technical assessment of the surprise attack
problem, the effectiveness of various measures aimed at reducing the danger
of surprise attack, and the technical requirements for various methods of in-
spection.65 No reference was made to a speciªc inspection zone.
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The Surprise Attack Conference that took place in Geneva from 10 No-
vember to 18 December 1958 has been described at length elsewhere.66 The
head of the U.S. delegation maintained that the conference “accomplished a
great deal,” but in fact the gap between the United States and the Soviet
Union over the question of inspection zones remained as wide as ever. The
Soviet ambassador to the United States, Mikhail Menshikov, asked what the
purpose of an inspection zone would be. The Soviet Union, he insisted, had
no aggressive agenda and no intention of launching a surprise attack, and thus
the proposal to set up an inspection zone in the Arctic separate from other
disarmament measures was intended solely to distract public opinion from
U.S. violations of Soviet territory. He also claimed that the area of the USSR
designated for inspection in the American plan was far larger than the desig-
nated area in the United States. Citing these factors, Menshikov vetoed the
resolution.67 Khrushchev, for his part, argued that an inspection zone might
make sense if based on the guidelines offered by the Soviet Union since
1955—namely, an 800-kilometer demarcation line separating NATO and
Warsaw Pact forces. The Soviet proposal also called for the Arctic inspection
zone to include a greater part of the United States to make it equal to the So-
viet area under inspection. Khrushchev also wanted the zone to be part of
broader disarmament measures. In keeping with a recent Soviet proposal for a
conference to study inspection of a nuclear test ban, Khrushchev called for
representatives from the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries
to meet and study measures to prevent nuclear surprise attack and other dis-
armament proposals.68 That was also the tone of the conference, spurring
both Dulles and Eisenhower to conclude that “military inspection to insure
against surprise attack . . . appeared to be ruled out.”69
Nevertheless, the idea refused to die. Although the Arctic inspection zone
proposal did disappear, Norstad together with the British kept alive the idea
of a European inspection zone—an idea that became known as the Norstad
Plan. British ofªcials believed that although such a zone could not offer a full
guarantee against surprise attack in an age of intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles, the political and psychological beneªts of penetrating Soviet areas were
of such importance that a European inspection zone would be worthwhile re-
gardless of its military and technical effectiveness.70 The plan was resuscitated
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in the United States as well. After the failure of the Surprise Attack Confer-
ence and the prolonged negotiations over a nuclear test ban amid growing in-
ternational pressure for progress on nuclear disarmament, the State Depart-
ment and Defense Department recommended to the president that an
interdepartmental study be launched on U.S. disarmament policy. Charles
Coolidge, a Pentagon ofªcial, was appointed director of the Joint Disarma-
ment Study.71 This appointment proved important because Coolidge came to
support the Norstad Plan and included it in the report he submitted in De-
cember 1959. The report indicated that serious disarmament negotiations
were a worthwhile long-term goal but that the United States should ªrst seek
to test Soviet intentions through limited measures, which would then facili-
tate a decision about long-term strategy. One such measure could be the
Norstad Plan, which, if successful, would have the additional beneªt of reduc-
ing the chance of a surprise ground attack in Europe. Moreover, because the
proposed area was relatively small in size, it could serve as a laboratory for de-
veloping inspection techniques and for testing the intentions and sincerity of
both sides. To overcome the political obstacles to the plan, Coolidge proposed
that the designated inspection area would not be deªned by national bound-
aries. His emphasis on the military value of the plan was also intended to
deºect the anticipated outcry.72 The State Department endorsed the Coolidge
Report and in accordance with Coolidge’s recommendations integrated the
Norstad Plan into the newly formulated U.S. disarmament policy that was in-
troduced in January 1960.73
With this, the process that had begun with Stassen came to fruition, and
U.S. disarmament policy was no longer based on a “package deal” approach.
Instead, U.S. negotiators would pursue gradual steps, with less than perfect
systems of inspection and veriªcation, and with a test inspection zone as an
important ingredient. The revolution—and revolution it was—that Stassen
sought to effect in U.S. disarmament policy was now complete, and the only
task that remained was to obtain the consent of all NATO allies. Norstad had
been pursuing this task since mid-1958, starting in West Germany. Herbert
Blankenhorn, one of Adenauer’s closest aides, expressed strong support for the
inspection zone plan, describing it as “simple, honest, valid, and useful.” Be-
cause Blankenhorn was a trusted conªdant of the chancellor, the U.S. ambas-
sador in Bonn assumed that Blankenhorn was speaking with Adenauer’s ap-
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proval, an assumption that proved incorrect.74 Adenauer’s reaction to the
European limited inspection zone against surprise attack was “categorically
no.” The chancellor argued that the plan’s limited geographic scope would en-
courage neutralism in West Germany and possible lead to the FRG’s with-
drawal from NATO. He had in mind the debate sweeping through West Ger-
many between those who wanted to see the country associated with NATO
and those who called for an independent European community. Adenauer
was also afraid that the plan would institutionalize the status quo and perpet-
uate the existence of two Germanys. He further warned that under the
Norstad Plan the Soviet Union would be given an opportunity to “conduct
subversive activities” in West Germany under the guise of inspections.75
French ofªcials were also negative, being apprehensive about the risk of
singling out Germany. At the same time, they feared an overly independent
FRG and were interested in keeping U.S. troops in Europe to dampen any
possible resurgence of nationalism in West Germany. French leaders favored
the nuclearization of NATO, believing that this would guarantee a continued
U.S. presence in Europe, and therefore had rejected the British Disengage-
ment Plan of 1958. For much the same reason, the French government now
rejected the Norstad Plan. French President Charles de Gaulle also noted that
because the West, not the East, was under danger of surprise attack, the pro-
posed zone should be narrower in the west and broader in the east by a pro-
portion of ten to one.76
Other NATO members were more receptive to the plan and its underly-
ing concept. Howard Green, Canada’s external affairs minister, “expressed en-
thusiasm for the plan,” as did the Norwegians and the Italians. The Nether-
lands and Belgium took no position, at least for the time being.77 These more
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positive evaluations, however, were hardly enough to outweigh French and
West German objections. To overcome these objections, Norstad began to
emphasize the political aspects of his plan, something he had earlier avoided.
He told Secretary of State Christian Herter, who had succeeded Dulles in
April 1959, that the plan would encourage détente, which outweighed any
anticipated political disadvantages and entailed no military risk for the West.
If anything, the plan would reap signiªcant military beneªts. In an age of
long-range nuclear missiles, the threat of conventional war in Europe seemed
remote, and the danger of local hostilities and events like the Berlin crisis be-
came more likely. An inspection system, he argued, would reduce the risk that
these crises would spark a surprise ground attack that could then, through
miscalculation, escalate into all-out nuclear war. Norstad’s arguments con-
vinced Herter that he should help the general in trying to persuade Adenauer
and de Gaulle of the plan’s advantages.78 The State Department would have
preferred that Norstad himself convince the Europeans to accept the plan, but
because the proposal was now part of U.S. disarmament policy Herter joined
Norstad in talks with the French and West Germans. Herter also tried to en-
list NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak in the effort, assuming that
the latter’s support would make it easier to convince Adenauer.79
An opportunity to persuade the West German chancellor of the advan-
tages of the Norstad Plan arose during Adenauer’s scheduled visit to Washing-
ton.80 The plan was added to the agenda of the Eisenhower-Adenauer meet-
ing, and Norstad himself presented it to the president. This was the ªrst time
that Eisenhower had been apprised of the plan’s details. Herter followed up
with a memorandum elaborating the points that the president should empha-
size in his meeting with Adenauer. To allay Adenauer’s fears, Herter advised
the president to emphasize that the sole purpose of the plan was the creation
of a system of mutual inspection to prevent surprise attack. As such, it would
not lead to any reduction of forces. As for Adenauer’s concerns about the size
of the inspection zone, the area subject to inspection could be deªned in
terms that covered parts of other NATO countries in order to avoid singling
out Germany.81
At the meeting with Adenauer, Eisenhower tried to allay the chancellor’s
fears, but the session proved to be counterproductive. As suggested by Herter,
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Eisenhower introduced the Norstad Plan in the broadest terms possible to cir-
cumvent Adenauer’s objections. Eisenhower made no reference to the territo-
rial dimension of the plan, claiming only that the United States intended “to
offer to the Soviets a plan for continuous aerial inspection, divorced from any
disarmament aspects, and operating in selected regions. It would be in the na-
ture of a try-out, to see if it would be workable during a given period.”
Adenauer’s reaction was “I would do it” and “It is a good idea.” The president
then added that it might include “one or two or three such areas, say, Siberia
or Alaska or Central Europe.” Adenauer’s response was that “it was an excel-
lent idea and would be a good test of Soviet good faith,” and he asked for time
to work out details of the plan in Bonn and in other NATO countries.82
However, when Herter tried to follow up and mentioned the territorial
aspects of the plan to Adenauer, the chancellor “reacted violently.” Adenauer
insisted that “in his conversation with the President there had been no men-
tion whatsoever of an inspection zone in Europe.”83 Was this misunderstand-
ing only the result of a “lapse by the interpreters,” as West German Defense
Minister Franz Josef Strauss tried to explain and as Eisenhower himself
claimed on a separate occasion?84 It is hard to tell. One thing that is clear is
that Eisenhower’s description of the Norstad Plan fell short of what it really
was. The president introduced the plan in passing and deliberately avoided
mentioning details that were certain to raise objections from Adenauer. When
the details of the Norstad Plan were presented to the West German delega-
tion, Foreign Minister von Brentano described it as “very bad and distasteful.”
He said that the West German government had already rejected it, and he
claimed that the plan, by singling out the FRG, was incompatible with
NATO’s concept of equality and could lead to the alliance’s disintegration. At
the very least, the plan would affect the deployment of U.S. forces. Von
Brentano asked Herter either to drop the idea or to extend the area under in-
spection.85
Despite this setback, U.S. ofªcials remained optimistic because Defense
Minister Strauss and his military advisers, including the army chief of staff,
Lieutenant-General Adolf Heusinger, were ready to consider the beneªts of
the Norstad Plan. Strauss believed that one of the reasons for the chancellor’s
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negative stance was his conviction that the plan was really just Norstad’s.
Strauss felt that Adenauer did not understand how strongly the proposal was
supported by the U.S. administration.86 Strauss and Gebhardt von Walther,
the Federal Republic’s permanent representative to NATO, who were both in
favor of the plan, hoped that a meeting between Norstad and Adenauer would
lead to a change in the chancellor’s deªant position.87
With the fate of the plan still in doubt, the Eisenhower administration
hoped to introduce the plan to the foreign ministers of four NATO countries
who were due to meet on 1 May 1960 in Istanbul. The main issue on the
agenda was Germany and the Berlin crisis, but the Americans sought to take
the opportunity to promote the Norstad Plan.88 The State Department sent
the plan to the British, French, and West Germans for review before the Istan-
bul Conference and waited for the outcome of the Adenauer-Norstad meet-
ing.89 Before meeting with Adenauer, however, Norstad wanted to ªnd out
what de Gaulle had said at his meeting with Eisenhower on 28 April 1960.
Having learned from Strauss that Adenauer had discussed the plan with de
Gaulle, Norstad wished to know, before he met the chancellor, what the
French president’s position was. Norstad ªgured that if de Gaulle was against
the plan, there was no point in meeting Adenauer.90 In this regard, the U.S.
State Department report on the Eisenhower-de Gaulle meeting was discour-
aging from Norstad’s point of view. The report indicated that Eisenhower had
described the plan the same way he had to Adenauer, including the reference
to Alaska and parts of Siberia. The important point, asserted Eisenhower, was
to ªnd out “whether the Soviets would really allow effective inspection.” De
Gaulle agreed that “effective inspection was vital,” but he claimed that it
would be better to pursue an agreement to prohibit delivery of nuclear weap-
ons by missiles and strategic aircraft and that the inspection mechanism
should be designed to check for possible violations of such an agreement. De
Gaulle’s proposal touched on the major obstacle to progress in disarmament
negotiations; namely, the Soviet Union’s refusal to allow inspections to be car-
ried out on its territory. Eisenhower mentioned this to de Gaulle, pointing
out that such inspections had been the crux of his Open Skies proposal, which
89
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had been rejected by the Soviet Union in 1955. Because de Gaulle agreed with
him about the vital importance of inspections, Eisenhower said that the U.S.
proposal was meant to test whether “such an inspection could be done prop-
erly and whether there was good will on the part of the Soviets.” But de
Gaulle remained concerned that the plan would single out Germany and
thereby increase neutralist tendencies in West Germany, possibly separating it
from the West.91 The French foreign minister, Maurice Couve de Murville,
emphasized that the political dimension of the plan, not its military dimen-
sion, was what worried the French. Militarily, he said, the plan was reason-
able, but the political consequences would be undesirable. One such conse-
quence might be the neutralization of Germany. Another might be the
denuclearization of the proposed zone. The only way to avoid such results
would be by extending the inspection zone to include parts of both the Soviet
Union and the United States.92
After learning of de Gaulle’s position, Norstad surmised that it would be
pointless to meet with Adenauer. However, West German ofªcials encouraged
him to speak with the chancellor, and the general agreed.93 The meeting took
place on 5 May, right after the Istanbul summit. Adenauer and von Brentano
met Norstad before the formal appointment, and the chancellor told the gen-
eral “categorically that the plan would destroy Germany.” The three then
joined other U.S. and West German ofªcials. In light of the initial exchange,
the formal meeting seemed irrelevant. Norstad voiced this sentiment in his
opening remarks, noting that “he felt he was delivering a funeral oration.”
That was indeed the case. Adenauer stressed the danger that would arise from
the presence of Soviet inspectors on West German soil. He also reiterated his
support for an inspection zone stretching from the Urals to the Atlantic.94 At
the same time, Adenauer dismissed the military advantages of the plan, claim-
ing that NATO already had sufªcient information about Soviet deployments
in the region. West German intelligence, he added, was capable of observing
the entry of additional military forces into Poland or other countries. “We
know the situation on the other side,” claimed Adenauer, and “furthermore,
movements of less than ten divisions are unimportant.” He also argued that
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the 30 divisions under Norstad’s command were enough to prevent a surprise
attack. Norstad responded that the plan would signiªcantly improve NATO’s
intelligence abilities and military preparedness, but Adenauer remained un-
convinced: “All I can see is that we lose the trust of the German people.”95
Adenauer “regarded the subject as closed,” and so, in fact, did Herter.96
But the chancellor wished to keep his rejection of the U.S. plan out of the
public eye. If his subsequent silence on the matter might have fed hopes that
the plan could be revived, those hopes were dashed when Die Welt obtained
information about the Norstad Plan and indicated that it would publish a re-
port. Any such publication would force Adenauer to come out publicly
against the plan, something he was anxious to avoid. An indication of the
mood in Bonn over the implications of the news leak is discernible in the de-
scription by Walter Dowling, the U.S. ambassador in West Germany, when
he saw the German foreign minister and the chancellor: “Von Brentano,
breathless and somewhat excited, joined the group.” To avoid the impression
that the chancellor was attacking a U.S. plan, von Brentano asked Dowling
whether the administration would announce that the Norstad Plan had been
initiated by General Norstad and not by Washington. The two of them and
Adenauer agreed that the best thing to do was to “play down the signiªcance
and status of the plan” by saying that it was only one idea among many and
that it had already been raised during the 1957 Disarmament Conference—
which was indeed true. They also planned to claim that the plan was never
ofªcially presented to the West German government. Von Brentano proposed
to go even further by having the administration announce its disapproval of
the plan, but Dowling convinced him that this was too extreme.97 One way or
another, with Die Welt’s publication of the story on 16 May, the plan was laid
to rest. However, the publicity was more a conªrmation than the actual cause
of death.98
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Conclusion
Ultimately, the Norstad Plan failed because of the opposition of de Gaulle
and Adenauer. Soviet leaders did not get a chance to respond to the plan, al-
though their response was predictable. The West German and French leaders
believed that the plan was as much political as military, despite the emphasis
given to military considerations by Norstad and Herter. The dynamics of the
intra-NATO negotiations over the proposal for a limited inspection zone and
the success of the two West European leaders in halting the plan provide a
good illustration of intra-alliance dynamics. Progress was achieved through an
exchange of views that took the interest of each party into account. The
United States did not arbitrarily exploit its unquestioned political and mili-
tary superiority within the alliance. The Eisenhower administration wanted
to see the Norstad Plan implemented as part of its nuclear disarmament strat-
egy, but U.S. ofªcials backed down in the face of determined West German
and French opposition.
The plan failed, but in the end it presaged a change in U.S. disarmament
policy—a conceptual transformation from disarmament to arms control in
which Eisenhower was an active participant. This marked an advance from
the futile aspiration to eliminate all nuclear arms to the more realistic goal of
partial agreements designed to increase mutual conªdence. (Only when
Mikhail Gorbachev fundamentally changed Soviet foreign policy in the late
1980s did actual reductions of nuclear weaponry become feasible.) Stassen
was the one who instigated this conceptual change in U.S. thinking about dis-
armament. He believed that the United States should abandon its “package
deal” approach, a phrase introduced by Charles Coolidge, and settle for the
gradual pursuit of partial agreements.99 He used Eisenhower’s Open Skies
proposal as leverage for making the change, transforming the “package deal”
by means of a partial plan. Despite encountering opposition within the ad-
ministration, he managed to win endorsement of his position from the State
and Defense Departments as well as from the president. The Norstad Plan
seemed to be a ªrst practical step in that direction, and Eisenhower wanted to
see it implemented.
In this respect, the Norstad Plan, like the U.S. position in the nuclear test
ban negotiations that were conducted concurrently, heralded the change in
U.S. policy on nuclear disarmament. Eisenhower was ready to give up the all-
or-nothing approach and make concessions that would render the U.S. pro-
posals more acceptable to the Soviet Union. He also relinquished another en-
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trenched position—the demand for a foolproof inspection system. The
Norstad Plan, which was Stassen’s brainchild, treated inspection more be-
nignly than did the plan that originated it all—the Open Skies proposal. The
Norstad Plan failed, but its real historical achievement was in facilitating a
conceptual change that paved the way for the Limited Test Ban Treaty and
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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